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Abstract
We analyse the relative performance of the IMF. OECD and 
EC in forecasting the government deficit, as a ratio to GDP, for 
the G7 countries. Interesting differences across countries emerge, 
sometimes supporting the hypothesis of an asymmetric loss func­
tion (i.e.. of a preference for underprediction or overprediction), 
and potential benefits from forecast pooling.
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In this paper we analyse the fiscal forecast record of the major inter­
national organizations - the IMF. OECD and the EC. We submit these 
forecasts (forecasts for the ratio of the budget deficit to output) to a va­
riety of tests for accuracy, efficiency and unbiasedness, using data for the 
G-7 countries, and. more especially for the 'European T subgroup of the 
G-7. An important motivation for this exercise comes from the recogni­
tion that deficit forecasts are playing an increasing role in macroeconomic 
policy decisions. This has been particularly obvious in the European iron- 
text where, for example, the operating procedures of the Stability and 
Growth Pact involve reference to forecast values of the fiscal deficit at 
more than one point. In an era of fiscal consolidation, this significance of 
prospective as well as of actual fiscal deficits is true more generally: so 
soon as sustainability' is mentioned, the forecast path of future deficits 
has to be added to the historical record for evaluation. It is important 
to enquire, therefore, into the reliability of such forecasts. There is also 
a more technical motivation for the work reported here. Implicit in stan­
dard forecast evaluation practice is the assumption that forecast misses 
exact symmetric penalties: hence a quadratic form for the loss function 
is routine. Recently, however. Granger (1997) has highlighted the fact 
that when the loss function is not of this form, the standard properties 
of optimal forecasts will not hold. The political context in which fiscal 
deficit forecasts emerge may well Ire one in which the costs of forecast 
misses are not symmetric: and. whilst the international organizations 
whose forecasts we examine here are under different political pressures 
from those which influence national governments, they are operating in 
a related political environment. Fiscal forecast errors may be especially 
sensitive ones. In this paper we use the fiscal forecast samples to evaluate 
whether the predictions meet the optimality criteria of nonquadratic loss 
functions.
In the paper we pay somewhat more attention to the set of IMF 
forecasts than we do to those of the OECD and the EC. for the simple 



























































































to collect for the other two agencies. In the next section we begin with a 
first evaluation of the IMF forecast record. In Section 3 we compare t his 
with the record for OECD and EC forecasts. In Section 1 we evaluate 
whether there is any evidence in favour of an asymmetric loss function. 
Section 5 concludes.
2 An evaluation of the IMF forecasts
In this section we analyse the IMF forecasts of gross deficit ratios for 
the G7 countries.1 We consider both year-ahead forecasts, which are 
identified with those published in October of year t for t+ 1 . and current- 
year forecasts, which are those published in May of year t for year t.“’ 
They are compared with first released actual data on gross deficit ratios. 
Such a comparison is the most interesting from a policy perspective, and 
further revisions of out-turn data usually do not appear to greatly affect 
the results of related forecasts (e.g. Artis (1988). Gallo and Mareellino 
(1998)).
The year ahead and current year forecast errors, defined as fore­
cast minus actual values, are graphed in figure 1. Deficit is defined as 
a positive value, so that a positive forecast error corresponds to over­
prediction. There seems to be evidence of systematic overprediction for 
Japan. Italy and the UK. and underprediction for Canada. IMF fiscal 
forecasts for G7 countries typically have been technical exercises in which 
the short-term budget projections of the national authorities are adjusted 
for differences in macroeconomic assumptions. Thus, the presence of bias 
can reflect either an institutional bias or, more likely, a bias in the na­
tional authorities' forecasts that is transmitted to IMF forecasts via the 
technical adjustments made to official projections. For example, in the 
case of Italy the improved performance after 1988 is probably related to
‘ AH the calculations were performed with GiveWin 9.1. see Doornik and Hendry 
(1997) and, e.g.. Mareellino (1998a).
2These are paradigm definitions. In practice, there have been variations in the 
Forecast timetable. See Artis (1988) for a complete list of forecast dates corresponding 




























































































the approval of Law 362. that basically made forecast values the target 
for economic policy. A third possible source of bias is the conditioning 
on actual as opposed to announced policies. The resulting forecasts can 
be expected to miss the impact effects of the changes in fiscal policy. 
Unfortunately, the original official projections used at the Fund were not 
available to us. so that it is difficult to distinguish among these three 
possible sources of bias.
The mean error (ME), mean absolute error (MAE) and root mean 
squared error (RMSE) are reported in Table 1. The worst performance 
both on MAE and on RMSE is again for Japan. Italy and UK. while the 
best one is for France. Germany and the US. The additional information 
present in the current year forecasts is useful in decreasing both the MAE  
and the RAISE for all the countries. We also run a Chow test for con­
stancy of the MSE. by splitting the sample and constructing the ratio of 
the MSEs in the two subsamples which, under the additional hypothesis 
of uncorrelated normal forecast errors, is distributed as F(k. j )  where k 
and j  are the number of observations in the two subsamples. Constancy 
is always accepted, except for Italy. Japan and UK. when current year 
forecasts are used. Similar results are obtained with Hansen's (1992) 
test.
The mean error is usually smaller than one point, and the absolute 
error is only slightly larger. This looks like a good performance, but 
the unit of measurement matters. When the same errors are expressed 
as percentages of actual values, the typical range is ±50 % . It is not 
always clear what is the right scale to be used from a policy perspective. 
Following standard practice in the forecast evaluation literature we will 
continue measuring errors as differences of forecast and actual values.
We now formally analyse the unbiasedness and weak efficiency of 
the forecasts. It has become conventional to claim that forecasts are 
“unbiased" when no =  0. ay =  1 in the regression
n h =  no +  c t i f h  +  u k- (1)
where a are the actual values, /  are the forecasts, and u is an error 




























































































forecast error (see. e.g.. Clements and Hendry (1998. Ch.3)). and should 
then be free of serial correlation. As Holden and Peel (1990) showed. 
(1) is sufficient but not necessary for unbiasedness: rather, unbiasedness 
should be tested for as the condition ,io =  0 in the regression
e/i =  8o +  t’/i! (-)
where e are the forecast errors, and v the demeaned forecast errors Weak 
efficiency also requires the forecast errors to be uncorrelated in time (see. 
e.g.. Clements and Hendry (1998, Ch.3)).
Table 2 reports, for year ahead and current year forecasts, the t- 
tests for 30 =  0. a0 =  0. rti =  1 (TO, T\. T2),  and a Lagrange Multiplier- 
test (C ) for lack of up to second order autocorrelation in the forecast 
errors, which is distributed as F (2. H  — 2), where H  is the number of 
available forecasts. Weak efficiency is accepted for all countries, except 
Japan, and the UK for current year forecasts. According to TO. unbiased­
ness is rejected only for Italy. Japan and Canada for year ahead forecasts, 
and for Japan and UK for current year forecasts, with borderline values 
for Italy and Canada. Such an outcome is coherent with the graphical 
and descriptive evidence provided earlier. Somewhat different results are 
obtained from T1 and T 2: they reject unbiasedness more often. This 
can be a small sample issue, but it can also be due to the different null 
hypothesis of the tests.
The sample of observations on hand is relatively small and it is 
tempting to consider whether the country data sets could be pooled. The 
last row of Table 2 presents the results from the pooled regressions, which 
this time reject weak efficeney. We also checked for constancy of the 
parameters of the equations (1) and (2) by means of the Hansen (1992) 
tests. It was almost always accepted in the single country regressions, 
but rejected in the pooled regressions, suggesting their inappropriateness 
for our data.
It is now interesting to compare the IMF forecasts with those from 
two naive models, a random walk without drift (which implies that the 




























































































also Marcellino (1998b) for additional results.3 The first two columns of 
Table 3 report the Theil statistics for the two models (T H 1 and T H 2 
respectively), which in this case simply coincide with the ratio of the 
RAISE for the IMF forecasts to that of the naive forecasts. Hence, a 
value of the statistic smaller than one indicates that the IMF forecasts 
outperform the naive forecasts.
The results are rather surprising. For year ahead forecasts a naive 
model achieves a smaller RMSE than the IMF for all countries, with the 
exception of the US. The performance improves for current year forecasts, 
when only the forecasts for Italy. Germany and Japan can be beaten.
Comparing the models using a determinstic criterion such as the 
Theil statistic can be misleading because the differences in the chosen 
criterion among the models may not be significant from a statistical point 
of view. Therefore. Diebold and Mariano (1995) proposed to base the 
comparison on the statistic
V H
D M  =  — Ar(0 .1). (3)
<t,i
where
<1, =  ~  <7 (e2j ) •
(/ is the loss function of interest, e.g. the quadratic loss <j(c) =  or the 
absolute loss g(e) =  |c|. <• j and co are the errors from the two competing 
forecasts, and (T,i is the standard deviation of d. Notice that if D M  is 
positive the loss associated with the first model is larger than that for the 
second one. Diebold and Mariano (1995) suggested to estimate rr,i with 
spectral based techniques but. given the small sample available and the 
non correlation of d, for almost all cases, we use the standard formula
H  -  1 j= i
•‘Fewer forecast errors are available for the deterministic forecasts because the 
parameters of the model have to be estimated. We have regressed the first five actual 
values on a constant and a trend, and used the estimated parameters to forecast the 



























































































The results are reported in Table 3 for both absolute loss ( DMA) .  
and quadratic loss (D M S ). For year ahead forecasts, the trend model 
outperforms the IMF for Germany, while the random walk is better for 
Japan and UK. and for Italy in the case of quadratic loss. For current 
year forecasts the random walk is better only for Japan, while the IMF 
forecasts are better than the trend forecasts for France. No other loss 
function differentials are statistically significant from zero, even if their 
signs are often positive, in particular for year ahead forecasts.1
A source of the problems of some of the IMF deficit forecasts could 
be the presence of structural breaks over the forecast period due to un­
modelled changes in economic policy. This could also explain the good 
forecasting performance of the naive models, because of their robustness 
to breaks, see e.g. Clements and Hendry (1997b). A possible remedy 
in this case is ‘ intercept correction” . The term “intercept correction” 
comes from the practice of those forecasters who use formal economet­
ric models for forecasting, of absorbing into a correction of the constant 
terms of the model's equations, persistent errors evident from their re­
cent tracking behaviour. Here this method is implemented by adding the 
lagged forecast error to the actual forecast from the model, i.e.
ir.fi, = fh + eh- 1 , ( 4 )
see e.g. Clements and Hendry (1997a). In practice this or other types of 
adjustment can be expected to be already present in forecasts from official 
agencies, but it seemed neverthless worthwhile experimenting with this 
adjustment. °
From Table 4. in the case of year ahead forecasts, it is seen that 
there is a marked deterioration in the weak efficiency property of the
4Notice that in the calculation of the Theil statistics the RMSE-s are calculated over 
the longest available period for each model, while for the DM test the same sample 
period is used for both models. This explains why for Japan DMS2 is negative even 
if TH2 is larger than one.
Tn (4) we are adding the forecast error to the forecast with a weight of one. As an 
alternative, the weight can be determined optimally (in the sense of minimizing the 
MSE) as the coefficient of c,_i when e»_i is included as a regressor in (1). Optimal 





























































































intercept corrected forecast error. Actually, if the original forecast errors 
are uncorrelated, we are simply adding an MA(1) term to them because
ice,, =  a,, -  ieft, =  eh -  o ,-i -  ( ’>)
There also no major changes in the unbiasedness properties of the fore­
casts. which remain biased for Canada. Italy and Japan. The results are 
better for current year forecasts, when all the forecast can be consid­
ered as unbiased after intercept correction according to the TO test, even 
if some correlation is introduced in the forecast errors for Canada and 
France.
The final question that we address in this section is whether errors 
in forecasting the deficit to gdp ratio can be explained by wrong forecasts 
of other relevant macroeconomic variables. A natural candidate is gdp 
growth. Unexpected growth increases the level of gdp and decreases that 
of the deficit (reflecting the operation of the automatic stabilizers): hence, 
growth forecast errors should be negatively correlated with deficit to gdp 
forecast errors. A negative effect of inflation on deficit forecast errors is 
also possible when the tax indexation system is not perfect.
This interpretation appears to be supported by the data. Table 
5 reports results from a regression of deficit to gdp forecast errors on 
growth and inflation forecast errors (eg and e7t). For year ahead forecasts. 
eg is significant and negative for Canada. France. Japan and UK. A 
significant and negative coefficient for e7t is found only for Canada and 
the UK. A  similar pattern emerges also with current year forecasts, but 
the coefficients are significant only for Canada and the UK.
In summary, the IMF forecasts are weakly efficient for the G7 coun­
tries with the exception of Japan, but they seem to be slightly upward 
biased for Italy. Japan and UK. and downward biased for Canada. In­
tercept corrections can improve the performance on the bias criterion of 
current year forecasts. In a comparison with simple random walk and 
trend forecasts, the IMF forecasts often lead to higher quadratic and ab­
solute loss, and the difference is statistically significant for a few countries 




























































































3 OECD and EC forecasts
In this section we analyse the OECD and EC forecasts for gross deficit 
ratios, and compare them with those from the IMF. We focus on the four 
European countries in the G7. namely, France. Germany. Italy and UK. 
both to reduce the volume of results to be presented and because these 
are the most interesting countries to analyse in the light of the deficit 
requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and of the Growth and Stability 
Pact. OECD deficit forecasts for all EU countries are analyzed in Artis 
and Marcellino (1998).
For the OECD, year-ahead forecasts are identified with those pub­
lished in December of year t for t+ 1 , and current-year forecasts are those 
published in June of year t for year t. For the EC, year-ahead forecasts 
are those published in the Autumn (October) of year t for t+ 1 . and 
current-year forecasts those released in the Spring (April) of year t for 
year t. It should also be recalled that there are some minor differences 
across the agencies in the definition of the deficit, so that in the construc­
tion of the forecast errors, defined as forecast minus actual values, we use 
the actual (first released) values from the proper agency. The year ahead 
and current year forecast errors are graphed in figures 2 and 3 for IMF. 
OECD and EC.
From Table 6. the mean forecast error is rather low. in practice 
always smaller than 0.5 points, for both the OECD and the EC. The 
M AE and RMSE are smaller than those from IMF forecasts for Italy and 
the UK. with the EC doing better than the OECD, but over a different 
sample period. The IMF performs better for France and Germany, with 
the exception of current year forecasts for Germany for which the EC 
achieves slightly smaller values. As for the IMF, the larger information 
set exploited in current year forecasts is useful in decreasing both the 
M AE and the RMSE.
The results from this first comparison should be interpreted with 
care because the sample sizes are different, in particular that for the EC 
is rather short, and the differences in the loss function may not be statis­




























































































Diebold and Mariano (1995) test, with an absolute and quadratic loss 
function, using for each comparison the common longest available sam­
ple period. We recall that if the statistic is positive the loss associated 
with the first set of forecasts is larger than that for the second one. The 
results are summarised in Table 7.
For year ahead forecasts, the IMF does significantlv better than the 
OECD and the EC for France, while for Germane the difference is not 
significantly different from zero, even if the loss from the IMF forecasts is 
still the lowest. The EC performs best for the UK and Italy, but only in 
the former case is the loss differential with the OECD and IMF statisti­
cally different from zero. For current year forecasts, the improvement in 
the performance of all the three agencies makes it harder to distinguish 
among them: actually just two loss differentials are significantly differ­
ent from zero out of 24. But the aforementioned pattern is overall still 
satisfied, with the IMF yielding a smaller loss for France, and the EC 
for Italy, while the performance of OECD and EC for the UK is rather 
similar.
As far as the weak efficiency and unbiasedness of the forecasts are 
concerned, the former hypothesis is always accepted for both OECD and 
EC forecasts; the tests are reported in Table 8. Such an outcome is 
similar to what we found for the IMF. when weak efficiency was only 
rejected for year ahead forecasts for the UK. Unbiasedness is also always 
accepted for year ahead forecasts when the TO test is used, see Table 8, 
while it is rejected by the T1 and T 2 tests for Germany, and also for Italy 
in the case of OECD forecasts. For current year forecasts, unbiasedness is 
rejected for Germany (and Italy using T1 and T 2) in the case of OECD, 
and for the UK (and Italy using T1 and T2) in the case of the EC. For 
the IMF. relying on the TO test, we found that year ahead forecasts for 
Italy and current year forecasts for the UK were biased.
The results so far seem to indicate that different agencies can do 
better for different countries, the IMF for France and Germany, the 
OECD and the EC for Italy and the UK. We now consider this issue in 
further detail by analysing whether the forecast errors from one agency 




























































































forecast encompassing, see e.g. Chong and Hendry (1980). Lu and Mi- 
zon (1991). Ericsson (1992). and Marcellino (1998). The basic forecast 
encompassing regression is
Cull — 70 +  7 l f j . h  +  U i.h- (fi)
where i =  I M F .  O E C D . E C . i /  j ,  h =  1......H. and the statistic
of interest is the t-test for -q =  0. Yet. with (6) we can only make 
bivariate comparisons. In order to evaluate whether the forecasts from 
two agencies are useful for explaining the forecast errors of the third one. 
we can extend (6) to
e ,.h  — t>0 +  6l f j , h  +  f a f k . h  +  u i.h - (T)
where k i. j .  and test for =  0. 60 =  0 either jointly with an F-test 
or separately with two t-tests.
The regression equation (7) can be rewritten as
«;./) =  <5o +  f i .h  +  6 1 f j h  +  6 2 fk .i 1  +  U i.h- (&)
If we remove the hypothesis that the coefficient of is equal to one. we 
get a third version of the forecast encompassing regression
«/./i — Co +  Cl f i .h  +  C 2 fj. l1  +  Ci f k . l i  +  U i.h- (9 )
or
e,./i =  Co +  (Cl — I )  f i .h  +  C2 f j . h  +  C 3 fk .l1 +  Ut.h- (10)
The hypothesis of interest in (10) is C2 =  0, C3 =  0. which can again be 
tested by either two t-tests or an F-test.
If a set of forecasts encompasses all the others, in the sense of 
explaining their related forecast errors, without being encompassed, it is 
a suitable candidate as the preferred forecast. Yet. this seldom happens, 
and a more common situation is that of mutual encompassing or lack 
of encompassing. In the former case, the forecasts can be evaluated 
on the basis of other criteria, such as the MSFE or M AE comparisons 




























































































specification of the underlying models should be somewhat improved. 
Yet. this is seldom feasible in the case of large macromodels, and a more 
usual procedure is to combine the forecasts themselves into one that has 
better properties than each of them separately. Actually. (9) can be 
also viewed as a standard forecast pooling regression, see e.g. Granger 
and Newbold (1986. Ch. 9). The estimated values of cjo. G- Cr and (,'3 
represent the optimal weights for the pooled forecast
P.fi.h — « '0  +  U'lfi.h +  W’2 fjj,  +  W3 fk.h- 
which is the one that minimizes the MSFE.
Tables 9 and 10 contain the t-tests for yj =  0 in (6). and G =  0. 
<*>2 =  0 in (7). Starting with year ahead forecasts, it turns out that the 
IMF forecast errors can be explained by the OECD and EC forecasts 
for Germany. Italy and UK: the OECD forecast errors can instead be 
explained by either IMF forecasts or EC forecasts or both for all the 
four countries: the IMF and OECD forecasts are instead statistically 
significant for explaining the EC forecast errors only for Germany. A 
similar pattern emerges also for current year forecasts, the major change 
being that the forecast errors for the UK by any one agency cannot be 
explained by the forecasts from the other ones. These results indicate 
a comparative adantage of the EC forecasts, and suggest the potential 
usefulness of forecast pooling, the final issue that we analyse.
When the hypothesis that the coefficient of in (7) is equal to 
zero is relaxed and (10 ) is used as the regression equation, fewer fore­
casts are significant in explaining the forecast errors from one agency, 
see Table 11. This can be due either to having relaxed an improper 
assumption, or to the fact that the sample size is rather short and the re­
gressors collinear. which can inflate the standard error of the estimators 
and bias the t-tests towards accepting their null hypothesis. The former 
possibility seems to be the most plausible, because when we excluded 
the EC forecasts from the comparison in order to increase the sample 
size and decrease the problem of collinearity, the results did not change 
substantially. From Table 11, it appears that the major potential gains 
from forecast combination are now for France in the case of year ahead 




























































































Summarizing, so far in this section we have analysed the OECD  
and EC deficit forecasts and compared them with the IMF forecasts 
using several criteria. On the basis of standard MSFE and MAE com­
parisons. the IMF seems to perform better for France and Germany, and 
the EC and the OECD for Italy and UK. Yet. often the difference in the 
loss functions is not statistically different from zero. The performance 
in terms of unbiasedness and efficiency is rather similar across the three 
statistical agencies. When using standard forecast encompassing regres­
sions there seems to be an advantage of the EC forecasts, whose related 
forecast errors cannot be explained by other forecasts. But when the 
less restrictive forecast, pooling version of the encompassing regression is 
adopted, this advantage disappears, as well as more generally the scope 
for forecast pooling, even if there still seem to be cases where it could be 
useful, e.g. for France.
In appraising the comparative performance of these forecasts, it 
must be borne in mind that they are not made at precisely the same 
times, and that the information set available to the forecasters is not 
identical. This also opens up the possibility of “herding behaviour", i.e., 
the first published forecasts can exert a direct influence on later released 
competing forecasts, see e.g. Trueman (1994). Such behaviour can be 
rational in a highly uncertain environment, when the goal is a good 
performance in terms of the public’s assessment of the organization's 
forecasting ability. If this were the case, we would expect the forecast 
errors of the IMF. OECD and EC to be highly correlated, and more so 
for the year ahead forecasts (when uncertainty is higher). Actually, this 
pattern appears to emerge in Table 12, in particular for France and UK.
Of course, other explanations for these results are possible, e.g. a 
different interpretation during the current year of the conditionality of 
the forecasts. The forecasts we consider here are all issued with the state­
ment that they are “based on present policies” , a phrase which means 
that credible statements, e.g. of government expenditure plans already 
authorized by the respective legislatures will certainly be reflected in the 
forecasts whilst statements of ambitious targets, even from influential 




























































































riod when the achievement of fiscal criteria has been so strongly enjoined 
by inter-governmental treaty and peer group pressure, distinctions of 
this type may become more controversial. A vivid illustration was pro­
vided by the EC's November 1996 forecast for Germany's deficit ratio 
which reflected Germany's announced target: EC forecasters argued that 
the target itself represented "present policies" and in the political cir­
cumstances of the time was not to be treated as falling on the "wishful 
thinking " side of the dividing line.
4 On the loss function
An assumption that we have maintained so far is that the loss function 
of the statistical agencies is quadratic. If this is not the case but the 
loss is a generic function. c(e). most of the conventional properties of the 
forecast errors from optimal forecasts are no longer valid. In particular, 
they are no longer necessarily unbiased and uncorrelated in time, and n0 
and oi in (1 ) can be different from zero and one. see e.g. Granger (1997). 
We now study whether a non linear loss function can be the cause of the 
rejection of some of these hypotheses for the IMF forecasts (see Table 2).
Granger (1997) shows that the aforementioned properties will hold 
for the first derivative of the loss function, c (e). namely:
i) c (>) is unbiased:
ii) c (<:) is uncorrelated in time:
iii) bo =  0 and <S =  0 in the regression
c (C/| ) =  f)Q +  bi ft, +  Ul,. (11)
Most of the literature on non quadratic loss functions focused on the 
derivation of the optimal forecasts for particular choices of c(e). see e g. 
Christoffersen and Diebold (1994). We follow a different route, we assume 
that the forecasts from the IMF are optimal for (the expected value of) 




























































































consider two rather standard choices for c(c). the asymmetric quadratic- 
function
When b/a >  1 or c >  0 (b/a  <  1 or c <  0) there is a higher loss from 
positive (negative) forecast errors, i.e., from overprediction (underpredic­
tion). For b/a close to one or c close to zero the loss functions can be 
well approximated by a quadratic function.
We now have to choose the value of the parameters of c(<■). We 
select b/a and c so that the empirical couterpart of condition i) is satisfied, 
i.e. we adopt the values of b/a and c such that the sample mean of <■ (r) 
is zero. They are reported in Table 13. The largest values of b/a are 
for Canada and France (underprediction is preferred), the smallest ones 
for Italy and Japan, and UK for current year forecasts (overprediction is 
preferred). This is a consequence of the values of the mean forecast error 
which is negative for the first set of countries and positive for the second 
one, see Table 1.
We can now verify whether conditions ii) and iii) hold or not. From 
Table 13. the non correlation of c (e) is always accepted for current year 
forecasts and it is rejected for year ahead forecasts only for Japan and 
UK. Yet. this represents an improvement with respect to the quadratic 
loss results in Table 2 only for current year forecasts for Japan.
The hypothesis that =  0 and <*)i =  0 (condition iii) is instead 
accepted only for Canada. France, and UK for year ahead forecasts, which 
though represents an improvent because it was rejected before for the first 
two countries, compare Table 13 and 2. For current year forecasts the 
hypothesis of interest is only accepted for Canada and UK. as for the 
quadratic function case.
In summary, the assumption that the IMF forecasts are optimal 
for a non quadratic loss function appears reasonable only for Canada
and the linex function




























































































and France, where overprediction seems to be more problematic than 
underprediction, even if such a conclusion can depend on our hypotheses 
on the loss function and its parameters.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we set out to review the accuracy of short term forecasts 
of budget deficit ratios by the three major international agencies making 
such forecasts - the IMF. OECD and EC. Each agency forecasts twice a 
year and we compared a short term and a slightly longer term forecast 
for each of these agencies. A  principal motivation for doing so was the 
evidence that such forecasts have come to play a more central role, es­
pecially in Europe, in macroeconomic policy adjustment than in earlier 
decades.
It is common in forecasting post-mortems to encounter the finding 
that ‘balance’ variables - the current account of the balance of payments 
or the budget deficit - are by far the least well forecast values in the set 
of leading macro variables of interest. In our case, however, we focussed 
on the forecast of deficits expressed as a ratio to GDP. This evidently 
takes care of the worst of the problem of forecasting the actual balance 
itself. Mean errors are usually below 0.5 points. And. whilst naive pre­
dictors seem to perform well relative to the forecasts under examination, 
the differences are not in general statistically significant. The relative 
accuracy of the forecasts from the different agencies was also examined; 
no single agency is 'best' for all countries, but there seems to be some 
'specialization’ - the EC seemed to perform particularly well for Italy, for 
example. We noted that these differences might be partially explained 
by reference to differences in the timing of forecasts (hence, available 
information sets) and also by differences in the interpretation of the con­
ditionality ( “present policies” ) of the forecasts. As the deficit forecasts 
have been especially sensitive politically, we thought it possible that the 
symmetric loss function normally applied in forecast post-mortems might 
be inappropriate; but on careful examination we found it difficult to sus­
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Table 1: IMF Forecasts - Descriptive Statistics
Country M E Y M A E Y R M SE Y Sample M E C M A E C RM SEC Sample
Canada -0.62 0.89 1.17 77-95 -0.37 0.77 0.91 76-95
France -0.22 0.63 0.83 76-95 -0.09 0.42 0.53 76-95
Germany 0.05 0.79 0.83 76-95 -0.02 0.60 0.70 76-95
Italy 0.99 1.67 2.28 78-95 0.80 1.62 2.14 76-95
Japan 0.96 1.60 2.01 76-95 1.18 1.39 1.84 76-95
U.K. 0.44 1.72 2.06 76-95 0.75 1.22 1.44 76-95
U.S. 0.14 0.66 0.76 76-95 0.21 0.63 0.73 76-95
The suffices Y and C refer, respectively, to year ahead and current year forecasts. 
ME. MAE. and RMSE are the mean, mean absolute, and root mean square errors.
Table 2: IMF Forecasts - Weak Efficiency and Unbiasedness Tests
Country TOY CY n r T2Y TOC CC TIC T2C
Canada -2 .66" 0.11 -2.78** -1.96* -1.93 0.13 -1.65 - 1 .11
France -1.17 1.83 -2.26* -1.90 -0.75 0.01 -2.15* -2 .0 1*
Germany 0.23 0.65 -5.83” -6.71** -0.09 0.60 -4.31” -4 .57"
Italy 1.98* 0.46 -4.22** -5.02” 1.75 3.26 -4.27** -4.99**
Japan 2.36* 4.40* -1.76 -4.01** 3.60” 5.73* -1.19 -4.27**
U.K. 0.94 7.50** -0.93 -1.44 2.64" 1.82 0.11 - 1.68
U.S. 0.78 2.60 -2 .20* -2.70” 1.26 0.24 -2.90** -3.82**
Pool 1.86 23.8** -3 .75" -6.70” 3.47** 14.01" -2.61* -6 .54 "
* find ”  indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
The suffices Y and C refer to year ahead and current year forecasts.
TO is the (t-) test for zero mean forecast errors ((3q =  0 in (2)).
0  is the (LM) test for uncorrelated forecast errors (f/, in (2)).




























































































Table 3: IMF Forecasts - Comparison with naive predictors
Year Ahead
Country TH l TH  2 D M  Al D M S  1 D M  A2 DMS'2
Canada 0.98 1.13 -0.10 -0.07 0.16 0.48
France 1.24 0.96 1.31 1.28 -0.69 -0.10
Germany 1.46 2.28 1.81 1.46 3.01" 2.42*
Italy 1.51 1.96 1.65 2.07* 0.74 1.49
Japan 2.00 1.63 3.05” 2.49* 0.86 0.42
U.K. 1.29 0.92 2.85” 2.23* -0.05 -0.60
U.S. 0.83 0.77 -0.88 -0.98 -1.32 -1.77
Current Year
Country T H l T H  2 D M A l DMS1 D M A ! DMS2
Canada 0.77 0.88 -0.30 -0.89 -0.25 -0.41
France 0.79 0.62 -0.75 -1.07 -2.22* -2.24*
Germany 1.11 1.74 0.77 0.56 1.97* 1.84
Italy 1.42 1.84 1.56 1.85 0.16 0.81
Japan 1.83 1.49 2.25* 2.05* 0.10 -0.24
U.K. 0.90 0.64 0.15 -0.63 -1.56 -1.62
U.S. 0.80 0.75 -0.98 -1.07 -1.06 -1.55
* and ”  indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
The suffices 1 and 2 refer to random walk and trend forecast comparisons.
Th is the Theil (RMSE) ratio




























































































Table 4: IMF Forecasts - Intercept Corrections
Country TOFF
Year Ahead 
C F F  T I F F T 2FF TOFF
Current Year 
C F F  T I F F T I F F
Canada -3.41* 5.83** -5.07” -3.51” -0.05 8.57** -3.05** -3.88"
France -1.44 11.9" -4.15** -3 .7 " -0.09 5.19* -2.SO” io IO
Germany -0.05 3.73* -8.33*“ -10.9** -0.21 4.30 -5.50” -5.92”
Italy 3.04** 2.20 -0.21” -8.57" -0.14 0.01 -0.34** -0.53**
Japan 2.82" 10.0" -3.01" -8.20" -0.10 0.01 -2.49* -2.89"
U.K. 0.90 17.9" -3.27" -5.13" -0.75 0.41 -2.72” -3.00"
u.s. 0.77 17.0** -2.99" -3.65" -0.08 0.02 -4.21” -4.04”
’  and ’ * indicate significance at 5% and 191 levels.
The suffix FF refers to statistics calculated with the intercept corrected forecasts (see (4)). 
See the notes to Table 2 for a description of the tests.
Table 5: The role of growth and inflation forecast errors
Country cil)' (7tY egC C7T C
Canada -0.32" -0.33" -0.43" -0.19
France -0.39" 0.13 0.08 0.22
Germany -0.10 -0.18 -0.25 -0.26
Italy -0.41 0.05 -0.53 0.31
Japan -0.58* -0.02 -0.21 -0.01
U.K. -0.95* -0.52* -0.71" -0.53**
U.S. -0.11 0.04 -0.13 -0.44
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.




























































































Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
OECD
Country M E Y M A E Y R M SE Y Sample M E C M A EC RM SEC Sample
France -0.09 1.02 1.22 77-95 0.20 0.55 0.70 76-95
Germany 0.48 0.97 1.18 77-95 0.42 0.80 0.98 75-95
Italy 0.17 1.36 1.72 78-95 0.49 0.98 1.24 78-95
U.K. -0.26 1.32 1.60 77-95 -0.03 1.04 1.22 75-95
EC
Country M E Y M A E Y R M SE Y Sample M E C M A E C RM SEC Sample
France -0.32 0.98 1.25 85-94 -0.14 0.64 0.90 81-94
Germany 0.05 0.91 1.07 85-94 0.24 0.55 0.73 81-94
Italy -0.10 0.48 0.64 85-94 -0.19 0.76 1.02 81-94
U.K. -0.41 1.13 1.54 85-94 -0.56 0.97 1.20 81-94
The suffices Y  and C refer, respectively, to year ahead and current year forecasts. 




























































































Table 7: Forecast Comparison - Diebold Mariano Tests
’t ear Ahead
Country D M  A IO D M S I O D M A I E D M S I E D M A O E D M S O E ‘ Winn (i
France -2.92” -3.06” -2.34* -1.85 0.88 0.29 IMF
Germany -1.18 -1.44 -0.54 -0.63 -0.52 -0.14 IMF
Italy 0.89 1.43 1.87 1.92 1.37 0.02 EC
U K . 1.42 2.01* 6.50” 3.24" 2.83” 3.50” EC
Current Year
Country D M A I O D M S I O D M A I E D M S I E D M A O E D M S O E "lim n er"
France -1.15 -1.43 -0.97 -1.03 -0.56 -0.70 IMF
Germany -1.45 -1.49 1.38 0.79 2.12* 1.28 EC
Italy 1.32 1.68 0.89 1.01 1.40 2.03* EC
U K . 1.43 1.82 0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.32 EC/OECD
* and ”  indicate significance at 5% and 1% levels.
The suffices IO. IE and OE refer to IMF-OECD. IMF-EC and OEC'D-EC comparisons. 




























































































Table 8: Weak Efficiency and Unbiasedness Tests 
OECD
Country TOY CY n r T2Y r o c c c TIC T2C
France -0.31 2.52 -1.57 -1.64 1.28 0.42 0.18 -0.47
Germany 1.88 0.01 -2.94” -4.51" 2.14* 0.30 -2.59* -4 .44"
Italy 0.41 3.58 -4.00" -4 .15" 1.78 0.80 -2.43* -2 .75"
U K . -0.37 2.96 -1.52 -1.36 -0.11 0.07 -1.61 - 1.88
EC
Country r o r c r n r T2Y TOC CC r i e T2C
France -0.79 4.25 -0.93 -0.66 -0.76 1.43 -1.35 1.85
Germany 0.14 0.67 -2.44* -3 .15" 1.95 0.16 0.40 -0.31
Italy -0.47 0.13 -1.67 -1.63 -0.74 0.19 -2 .59" -2.52*
U.K. -0.83 1.34 - 1.22 -0.91 -2.05* 2.48 -3 .09" -2.079*
’  and ** indicate significance at and 1% levels.
The suffices Y and C refer to year ahead and current year forecasts.
TO is the (t.-) test for zero mean forecast errors (0$ - 0 in (21).
C is the (LM) test for uncorrelated forecast errors (tv, in (2)).




























































































Table 9: Forecast Comparison - Encompassing Tests. Year Ahead
F / a/ f F ofc'f F f f
France
F / a/ f - F oecd F / a/ f - F/,-(- F o f f />. F//f
t/A/F — -0.52 -0.04 — -0.71. 0.68
eOEC'D -0.65 — -0.54 — -2.64” . 2.15*
OEC -1.77 -0.94 — -1.84. 1.14
Germany
F / a/ f F OECD F f f F / a/ f - F o f f d F / a/ f - F f f F o f f />. F f f
6/A/F — -2.94" -2.48" — -1.37. 0.37
VOECD -3.09" — -1.38 — -0.46. -0.40
eF.c -2.12* -3.28" — -0.47. -1.58 —
Italy
F / a/ f F OECD F f f F / a/ f i  F o e f d F / a/ f - F f f F OECD- FEC
Cim f — -6.05" -4.67" — -3.64". 1.76
epECD -1.40 — -3.74" — 0.52. -1.86 -
eFr -0.66 -1.07 — 1.61. -1.84
U K .
F / a/ f F OECD F f f F / a/f - F oecd F / a/ f - F f f F o f f //- F f f
eniF — -0.50 0.08 — -2.48*. 2.44'
eoEcn -1.23 - -0.43 — -2.20'. 1.89
egr -1.4 1 -1.19 — -1.07. 0.82 —
* mid ”  indicate significance at 5VJ and i ’A levels, 




























































































Table 10: Forecast Comparison - Encompassing Tests. Current Year
France
F I M F F O E C D Fec F IM E '  F O E C D  F /A//-'- F /r I' (>/■'( •/>• F /./< ■
C i m f — -0.81 1.11 — -0.93. 1.2(i
e O E C D 0.13 — -1.37 -1.82. 1.71
e EC 1.02 1.33 — 0.44. -0.92
Germany
F /a/ f F O ECD F El" F/MF- Fo e c p F IMF- Fec F o F c n -  F Et '
e / A / F — -2.82” -0.18 — -1.77. 0.08
ZO E C D -5.63” — -0.10 — -3.82” . 0.49
?EC -1.40 -0.18 — -2.43*. 1.88
F I MF F O ECD F e c
Italy
F /a/ f - Fo E c n F IM F -  F EC Fo/rn- F EC
eniF — -1.05 -3.80" — 0.51. -2.53”
ZO E C D -0.99 — -2.49* — -0.62. -1.98*
ÏE C -0.65 -1.23 — 0.44. -1.08
U.K.
F IM F F  O E C D Fec F /a/ f - Foecp F m i - Fec I'alien- I
e / A / F — -0.91 -0.22 — -0.79. 0.65
?O E C D -0.62 — -0.13 — -0.11. 0.06
CEC -1.13 -1.41 0.60. -0.98
* and ** indicate significance at 5% and 1 'A levels,
































































































F n n '  F o e c d F  EC cons!.
Currrent year 
F im e  Foecii F ,.<•
e / w -1.67" -2 .19" -0.95* 2.41** -0.25 -0.44 0.20 0.14
eO E C D -2 .56" -2.33" -2 .54" 3.87" -0.06 0.03 -0.24 0.26
eEr -2.74” -2.54" -1.65" 3.14" -0.96 -0.17 0.2S -0.31
Germany
c o n s t .
Year ahead
F  IM F  F O E C D F EC c o n s t .
Currrent year 
F i m e  F o f c h F E( ■
e iM F -1.91** -1.02** -0.59 0.51 -1.44* -0.94 0.08 0.05
e o E c n -1.40* -0.19 -1.33* 0.85 -0.97 -0.43 -0.26 0.04
£ e c -1.39* -0.19 -0.40 -0.13 -0.47 -0.91* 0.28 0.02
Italy
Year ahead Currrent year
c o n s t .  F n i p  F O ECD F  EC c o n s t . F e m e  F o e c d F EC
e n i F -5.38* -0.40 -1.02 0.88 -5.92" -0 .41" 0.40 -0.60
eO E C D -6.03** 0.29 -0.75 -0.15 -7.61" 0.34* -0.88** -0.22
e E C -6.27** 0.29 0.26 -1.20* -7.54” 0.31 0.11 -1.20**
U K .
c o n s t . .
Year ahead 
F IM F  F O ECD F EC c o n s t .
Currrent year 
F /a/ f F o e c d F EC
e / j i /E -0.17 -1.71 -0.52 2.10 0.08 -0.45 0.04 0.36
CO ECD -0.39 -0.61 -1.41 1.87 -0.22 0.45 -0.74 0.21
eE C -0.83 -0.65 -0.23 0.66 -0.74* 0.58 -0.10 -0.66*
* and ** indicate that the associated t-tests reject non significance at 5% and 1% levels. 
The samples are 1985-1994 (year ahead) and 1981-1994 (current year).
The optimal pooling coefficient on the forecasts which are from the same agency as 




























































































Table 12: Correlation of Forecast Errors. 1985-1994
5'ear Ahead
France Germany
IMF OECD IMF OECD
OECD 0.89 1 OECD 0.65 1
EC 0.94 0.97 EC 0.70 0.86
Italy UK
IMF OECD IMF OECD
OECD 0.73 1 OECD 0.96 1
EC 0.25 0.78 EC 0.88 0.95
Current Year
France German}
IMF OECD IMF OECD
OECD 0.82 1 OECD 0.63 1
EC 0.22 0.46 EC -0.03 -0.23
Italy UK
IMF OECD IMF OECD
OECD 0.52 1 OECD 0.86 1




























































































Table 13: IMF Forecasts - Asymmetric Loss Function 
Weak Efficiency Tests
Year Ahead
Country bln C Q TIQ T2Q c CL 7T/„ TIL
Canada 5.53 0.69 -1.59 -1.68 2.05 0.74 -1.16 -1.23
France 2.05 1.90 -1.61 -1.82 0.77 1.57 -1.69 -1.91
Germany 0.88 0.44 -5.75** -6.41** 0.00
Italy 0.26 0.16 -2.88** -2.95** -0.40 0.09 2.32* 2.38*
•lapan 0.25 3.89* -2.62** -3.07** 0.00
U.K. 0.59 7.79** -1.56 -1.60 -0.19 6.57** 1.72 2.09*
u.s. 0.65 2.87 -2.48* -2.65** -0.46 2.92 2.43* 2.61**
Current Year
Country b/a CQ T\Q T2Q c CL T\L TIL
Canada 2.85 0.35 -1.30 -1.37 1.22 0.21 -1.24 -1.29
France 1.54 0.02 -1.78 -2.02* 0.71 0.01 -1.73 -1.96*
Germany 1.05 0.59 -4.31" -4.62" 0.06
Italy 0.34 3.16 -3 .74" -3.83" 0.34 2.32 3.28" 3 .36"
Japan 0.08 0.58 -2.10* -2.42* 0.00
U.K. 0.24 1.63 -1.02 -1.22 0.00
U.S. 0.51 2.29 -3.24" -3.50** 0.00
* and "  indicate significance at 5'/ and Wt levels.
The suffices Q and L refer ro the asymmetric quadratic and linex loss functions. 
C is the (LM) test for non correlation of c (e).
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